Social Psychology

Chapter 15: Social Behavior in Relation to Society

Floyd Henry Allport

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The Place of Social Behavior in the Social Sciences. Social psychology, as defined in Chapter I, is the science of the social behavior and social consciousness of the individual. This point of view has been maintained fairly consistently up to this point. Whether the situation studied has been the face-to-face relation, the group, the crowd, or the complex adjustments of family and social life, the focus of attention has always been the individual in his relation to other individuals. It is the purpose of this closing chapter to apply the laws of social behavior and consciousness to somewhat broader fields, such as social groupings, institutions, and the movements and changes of society. We enter here the domain of the social sciences, and particularly that of sociology. Since all behavior phenomena of groups are reducible to mechanisms of individual behavior in the social environment, the relation of social psychology to the disciplines which treat of these higher aggregates is a fundamental one. This relationship will be developed in detail in the following pages.


Social Behavior in Relation to Population.

The character of the physical groupings of individuals has an effect, through the interchanges of social behavior, upon the development of individual traits. The isolation of inhabitants of rural districts diminishes both the consciousness of the group and social attitudes reflecting the obligations of the individual to the group. Zeal for securing approval and for cooperation through awareness that others also are laboring for the good of the community is less intense than in the city. As pointed out by Professor Groves, the monotony and isolation of farm life fosters a suggestibility toward the newspaper and other propaganda coming from centers of great population. The prestige of numbers causes a considerable drift of the children

(383) of farmers toward the city. The more energetic, and those fitted for rapid interchanges of social stimulation and response seek urban life, leaving the slower, less mobile types for the rural community. City life furthermore offers spheres of achievement for the more ascendant and ambitious youths from the country. Slowness in reaction is of course developed in succeeding rural generations by the tempo of social stimulations encountered by the individuals in early years, and perhaps by heredity.

A serious result of the lack of group control in rural life is the defect of socialization within the family. The sex drive, unconditioned by the restraints of culture, and abetted by the direct example of nature, becomes too precocious in its expression. The drudgery of both parents, moreover, allows little possibility for the development of the finer traits which grow out of intimate and affectionate association with the offspring (cf. pp. 363-64). City life provides many opportunities for contact and discussion, and therefore develops inventions and progressive measures more rapidly than the country (cf. p. 289). Novel ideas and the production of geniuses are less frequent in rural than in urban communities. Movements are now on foot in some localities to supply the lack of social attitudes and discussion by converting the country church and school buildings into social centers. Although city life is on the whole more highly socialized than rural, it too exhibits some tendencies of distinctly anti-social character. Mob-like behavior is frequent both in actual crowds and in the 'stampede of public opinion.' Crowding, especially in the poorer sections, heightens competition and develops in children an aggressive, elbowing ascendancy quite opposed to the ideals of good citizenship.

The small town also presents definite problems of social behavior. Its crowds and publics consist of individuals who all know one another. The attitudes therefore of conformity and conservatism are more firmly established than in larger centers. Subservience to class made morals-and opinions in small towns has been satirized in recent fiction. Loves and hatreds are intense; and the prevalence of primary groups gives play to unmitigated gossip and scandal-mongering. This very emphasis upon social self and

(384) community opinion, however, affords possibilities for constructive civic organization. Unfortunately much of it is at present directed toward pretense of city life and creation of a caste which looks down upon the neighboring country-dwellers (Douglass). This may represent in part a conflict against recognition of cultural inferiority to the city.

Primary Group and Community. Sociologists have justly emphasized the function of face-to-face groups, such as the family and the neighborhood group, in the socialization of behavior. The importance of the family in this connection has already been discussed. These groups also provide a means for transmitting the culture and traditions of society. School children frequently form face-to-face groups of a fairly lasting character. Groups of this sort are usually of one sex, and are necessarily small, because each newly added member, having a possibility of disagreeing with every other member, increases the chances for disharmony by a number equal to the membership already present (Clow). These groups have a pedagogical value for inculcating moral attitudes through impression of universality and circular reinforcement among their members (pp. 305-07).

Communities are small aggregates whose members are governed by attitudes and modes of conduct which they recognize to be universal within the group. Social projection, conformity, and the social self are prominent in the community attitude of individuals. The impression of universality is strengthened if there is sufficient organization to bring the individuals together in meetings. Such gatherings therefore greatly promote spontaneous cooperation in public enterprises. In most cases, however, personal leadership is necessary in order to direct the various crowd mechanisms within the community toward some definite goal. The egotism fostered by the crowd situation (or by one's imaginal public) serves here as a useful aid to cooperative effort (p. 316). Such egotism takes the form of 'local pride.' Dr. Boodin considers these small, closely knit publics to be the true moral units of civilization.

Caste and Social Class. Aggregates based upon attitudes of superiority toward outsiders have been conspicuous in the social order of nearly every nation. In certain Oriental countries, and

(385) in some nations of the Occident, hereditary caste systems have erected impossible barriers against aspirants of humbler birth. In ` more democratic countries the consciousness of acquired social class is often instilled into the minds of the young before they leave the family circle. Sharing in the impression of superiority conceived to be universal in his group; the member of the upper class feels securely at ease. If he becomes impoverished, immoral; or degenerate, or if he is personally a nonentity, his badge of caste saves him: he is still reckoned as a member of one of the 'best families.' Rationalizations of this sort serve as defenses against the perception of deeper truths.

An important causal factor, and one usually overlooked, is the attitude toward the higher caste of those not in the caste itself. This attitude is one of respect and submission, tinged with admiration and perhaps envy. The egotism of the aristocrat feeds directly upon the self-abasement and submission of the proletarian. To abolish obeisance to caste would be to abolish caste itself ; for the real nature of the phenomenon is an attitude in individuals, and not an objective social fact. True nobility must reside in persons, not in classes. Superiority which is ascribed to a group rather than to individuals is indeed a fiction (cf. the discussion of 'collective mind' in Chapter 1).

Class distinction of some sort is perhaps inevitable, because innate or circumstantial inequalities among individuals will always enforce recognition. Provided the system is not too rigid to prevent rise through merit, it is not wholly an evil. So long also as the submissive attitude of the lower order does not become a hostile one there is no menace to social unity. But where resistance to recognition of inferiority springs up, radical action, and even revolution, are imminent. Thus in England a peaceful class system has existed for generations, while in America, with its widespread and crowd-like conflicts, the very beginnings of class recognition bring disruptive changes. Economic struggle is rapidly becoming a class warfare.

Occupational distinctions of class deserve a word of comment. Efforts are made so to elevate one's vocation that it shall be a credit to one's self. There are perhaps few who would not like to

(386) be listed as a member of one of the recognized professions.' That failing, a trade union with a long and imposing name will suffice. Professional standards in medicine, law, and academic fields guard the prestige of the calling against unworthy aspirants. The use of titles is punctiliously exacted in certain quarters. 'Professional etiquette' and 'ethics' are frequently rationalized names for class made morals and distinctions of vocational caste.

Race and Racial Adjustments. The psychological differences between races are just beginning to attract the attention of scientists. M. Le Bon mistakenly held that there is a gap between superior and inferior races amounting almost to a distinction of species. The vast differences in cultural adaptation between primitive and civilized races are to be ascribed as much to 'social inheritance' and environmental factors as to innate difference of capacity. It is fairly well established, however, that the intelligence of the white race is of a more versatile and complex order than that of the black race. It is probably superior also to that of the red or yellow races.[1]

This discrepancy in mental ability is not great enough to account for the problem which centers about the American negro, or to explain fully the ostracism to which he is subjected. High emotionality and defect of inhibition are supplementary causes. The truth of this statement seems to be attested by a greater variability of blood pressure in the negro than in the white man ,[2] as well as by overt indications. Investigations of these functions and of the possibility of educative controls of emotion are urgently needed at present.

The heart of the negro question, however, is to be reached, not in the sphere of intelligence or temperament; but of sociality. The negro has not been educated socially; his drives have not been

(387) conditioned or modified by agencies of social control. The reason for this seems obvious; but it is remarkable that it has so frequently been overlooked. In preceding chapters we have observed that the time for socializing the fundamental activities is childhood, and the place for doing it is the home. In post-adolescent years, or even in later childhood, the inhibition of anti-social trends and the formation of socialized habits become almost impossible. The reason why the negro tends to be asocial is that, growing up in an environment of poverty and ignorance, where stealth and depredation are often the accepted means of livelihood, he has had no opportunity for developing socialized traits.

We often hear the charge that the more you educate the negro, the worse he becomes. This is unfair; for the negro, though less gifted than the white man, is highly educable. His progress in fields of practical education has shown this. The whole trouble has been that the moral side of his education was not begun soon enough. He becomes literate and learns the skilled trades; but the deeper foundations of early character training are lacking. The aim, therefore, should be not only for more education, but for earlier education. We need not so much colleges for members of the colored race as homes in which they can be properly reared. Specifically we need organized supervision of the moral influences brought to bear upon young negro children. This, to the writer's knowledge, has never been seriously attempted. If it can be accomplished, a great amelioration will probably occur in the racial situation of this country. The laissez-faire insistence upon the innate hopelessness of the negro has been one of the obstacles to such a rational procedure.

Attitudes of suspicion and hostility are shown in many localities not only toward members of different races, but toward immigrants of other nationalities. Crowd influence in the public produces its usual effect of intolerant conservatism. The cry is for exclusion or else for immediate Americanization. There can, of course, be no true nation unless a recognition of common interests and ideals by each individual binds the whole body politic together. But this fact provides no evidence that the only desirable form of culture is that possessed by the 'uncontaminated' American. Solidarity

(388) of this narrow and provincial sort serves in some sections of the country as a defense against the recognition of backwardness in education and culture.

Nationality. The psychology of nationality has been well discussed in recent literature. Nationality transcends the bounds of racial and geographic origin and even of language, though homogeneity in these respects naturally favors its development. Professor McDougall considers national consciousness to be the extension of the 'self-regarding sentiment' to include the entire nation, so that a man himself feels proud when his country prospers, and is personally angered when his country is insulted.[3] There is in this nothing which necessitates considering a nation as a psychological entity or as possessing a 'collective' or a 'group' mind. National honor is located solely in the individuals of the nation. Insults to the flag bring personal resentment because this emblem has become a conditioning stimulus for the individual's attitudes of self-esteem and personal security. An abasement of the flag therefore thwarts these attitudes and evokes the struggle response.

National consciousness is the consciousness which the individual has of his nation as a whole. It consists of imagery of a vast number of people, of awareness of traditions which he supports in common with all the rest, and of present interests and ideals toward which all are disposed in the same manner as he. This overwhelming impression of universality combines with the early teaching of patriotic attitudes to give nationalism a supreme power over the behavior of the individual. The exaltation of self-consciousness through identification with the nation plays no small part in this control. Hatred and struggle against a common enemy bring the impression of universal patriotism and cooperation into the focus of attention, and thus foster national solidarity.



The Origin of Human Aggregation. The topic of nationality leads naturally into the broader question of human society itself. Original social aggregates among mankind were probably kinship groups. In the overlapping of generations and permanence of family ties we have a sufficient explanation of the beginnings of gregarious life. Among primitive peoples kinship is still the basis of social organization. Reaction within the family provides an origin for sympathy, susceptibility to social stimulation and approval, cooperation, control, and other functions necessary for social union in the larger aggregates. There is little need, therefore, for a theory to explain the origin or existence of social groups; our interest lies rather in describing and interpreting the nature of their communal life.

The Nature of Society: Theories of the 'Ego-Alter ' Type. We may illustrate in their extreme form two opposed conceptions which have been prominent in the theory of social aggregation. The viewpoint of Le Dantec represents the first conception. This writer maintains that egoism, or self-interest, is the basis of all society. Each behaves solely for his own benefit. For defense against enemies, however, individuals join into a society, and allow their 'egos' to be somewhat 'deformed' by necessary concessions to others. Organized cooperation is thus maintained for the individual's good. Altruism is a rationalized hypocrisy. There are set up customs and laws the origin of which in self-interest must not be questioned too closely. Such controls are therefore regarded as 'Metaphysical Absolutes.' This view is really a modern psychological version of the social contract theory.

The reverse of this notion is exemplified in the theory of Dr. E. W. Hirst. He conceives social union as originating in the complex familial instincts for the recognition, love, and care of offspring. These 'social instincts' are extended to wider circles than the family. As the pregnant mother in feeding herself also nourishes her child, so the welfare of others is instinctively sought as a part of our own welfare. " Conscience," says Hirst, " is tribal government set up in the human breast."


The truth of the matter probably lies between these two doctrines. Hirst's view that the individual is innately socialized lacks adequate foundation. Love fixations in the family, though they may become the basis of love for fellow man, are not social instincts. On the other hand Le Dantec's notion of the permanently unsocializable nature of man is equally mistaken. Apart from selfinterest human beings acquire a definite drive and interest in promoting the welfare of others. Le Dantec's 'deformation' is really the normal form of modification of the prepotent responses.

Imitation and Sympathy Theories. Tarde, who has been called the founder of social psychology, was impressed with the repetitive character of all natural phenomena. Society was considered by him to be based upon uniformities of behavior spread throughout the group by imitation. Inner meaning or spirit was, he thought, imitated before the outer form of culture, and intellectual elements before material. There is also imitation of the higher caste by the lower. Tarde's theory, though it has inspired notable successors, is psychologically antiquated. Imitation as a cause of behavior is now largely discredited (cf. pp. 77, 239), while greater emphasis is placed upon the non-imitated original drives underlying the acquisition of both uniform and unique behavior.

A theory based upon sympathy between similarly constructed individuals has been developed by Professor Giddings. 'Likemindedness,' the sum of all similar feelings, thoughts, and acts, is the basis for the acquisition of a consciousness of kind which knits the group firmly together. More recently Professor Giddings has restated his conception in the following behavioristic manner under the title of 'Pluralistic Behavior.' The caw of one crow is more readily stimulated by the caw of another crow than by any other agency. Association follows this line of least resistance (greatest similarity), and individuals having like mechanisms of response tend to be drawn together. A stimulus, if strong enough, produces like responses in like organisms, a fact which gives rise to social solidarity. Circumstantial pressures, however, introduce new elements and dissimilarities; hence arises a conflict resulting in social change and progress.

The notion of consciousness of kind has had a well-merited in-

(391) -fluence. Without recognizable similarities of expression, sympathy would, on either the instinctive or the conditioned-reflex theory, be impossible. Consciousness of kind is an elementary form of the impression of universality: it is the awareness of that universality of human nature which guarantees the essential agreement of all individuals.

For 'pluralistic behavior' there seems to be less empirical support. Human beings associate not to evoke like responses, but to react to one another in all ways, like or unlike, with the social behavior which best satisfies their needs. Social coordination is often served by unlike reactions, as in the ascendance of the parent and submission of the child. Progress and change involve conflicts not between like and unlike, but between the new and the old as vested interests of opposed individuals. In some respects, however, the theory is suggestive. Similarity of action-patterns among individuals affords a ready basis for forming ear-vocal responses in the transmission of language (pp. 183, 194). Language of course is fundamental in social union. Similarity of nervous structure also enhances social facilitation and suggestion in groups and crowds. It is in the direct social stimulation of face-to-face relationships that the theory seems inadequate.

The conclusion we may draw from the present discussion is that no single theory is sufficient to comprehend the facts of human aggregation. Given the bare existence of human beings in one another's presence, they may be expected to develop an intricate and far-reaching system of social stimulation and response. This system furnishes the data for the entire science of social psychology. It cannot be formulated into a single theory without oversimplification.


The Nature of Social Control. Orderly social life necessitates a certain degree of subordination of individuals to one another and to the regulated institutions of society. Without such control unity and coordination would be impossible. Social control is sometimes regarded as a purely external phenomenon, as if the controlling pressure were applied physically to individuals, moving

(392) them as a child moves his dolls. This conception is misleading. The mechanism of control lies within the individual. The whip controls the child because it evokes withdrawing reactions, first from the whip, and then from the forbidden activities in connection with which it is applied. The mere presence of the whip later has the effect of causing withdrawal from the contemplated misdeed; it has become a conditioning stimulus for the inhibition of wrongdoing. In the same way the punishments of the law condition and control the withdrawing responses of individuals. Punishment through the threatened loss of social esteem (social self) serves a like purpose. Were it not for this conditioning of primitive responses and of inhibitions, social control would be impossible. Society uses the fundamental responses of its members in order to control them.

Throughout the preceding chapters we have noted instances of control in face-to-face relations. Animals drive away their enemies through snarls and show of teeth, stimuli which by conditioning have acquired the power of evoking the withdrawing response of intruders. Monkeys control one another through the conditioned stimulation of the sexual reactions (p. 162). Children gain proficiency in speech by using language to control their parents (p. 187). Suggestion illustrates a pure form of social control, and conversation an imperfect form. The 'hurt cry' of the child is a reaction used to coerce others. Infantile control of other,; persists as an adult interest in evoking reactions, as shown in face-to-face sociability groups (p. 287).

We proceed now from these face-to-face coercions to the impersonal and organized social agencies which control each person for the interests of all. First, however, we must describe a few intermediate and unorganized forms. These include fashion, fad, craze, convention, custom, rumor, public opinion, and mob rule.

Unorganized Controls: Fashion. Fashions originate with garment manufacturers and milliners who exploit the controls inherent in social behavior for their personal interests. Certain persons who seek to assert their individuality and who crave the superficial admiration of others, quickly don the new style. These are usually the more suggestible persons, who first succumb to the display

(393) models and advertisements of the merchant. When a few appear in the new mode the impression of universality and social conformity begin to work upon the general public. There arises an unthinking impression that all are adopting the style. Exceptions are overlooked. Social conformity (p. 278) swings the individual into line, and completes the attitude to purchase the new attire. The first stage of suggestion is thus accomplished (p. 245). These combined attitudes are commonly expressed by the phrase, " they are wearing." The average person seeks to be a follower rather than a leader of fashion. He aims at conformity rather than differentiation. This fundamental and unreasoning conformity is generally rationalized by saying that one does not wish to appear shoddy, careless, out of date, or conspicuous.

Distinctions of caste allow the manufacturers to keep the styles profitably moving. Those of the humbler level seek to identify themselves with the rich and exclusive by simulating the garb of this class.[4] These in turn, finding their exclusiveness threatened, hasten to adopt a new mode. Thus pursuit and differentiation follow one another in endless succession.

Fad and Craze. The following of fashion and other popular interests sometimes reaches an emotional intensity suggestive of crowd behavior. This is the phenomenon of fad or craze. Imaginal factors in the crowd-public become very vivid. 'It's all the rage' is the popular statement of the impression of the universality of these excitements. A compulsion toward conformity is felt, not unlike that in the crowd situation. Sociologists writing upon fad and craze have slighted the fact that these controls originate in the basic reactions of the individual. Fads such as bobbed hair, rolled stockings, feminine smoking, and general ‘flapperism' are based upon the desire to arouse the interest of the opposite sex. Much of the present-day superficiality seems to express a persisting infantile drive for compelling attention through self-exhibition (cf. p. 287). Financial crazes represent a combination of prepotent and derived reactions; hunger, sex, social control, and desire for distinction being the predominant interests. Although particular fads and crazes rest largely upon individual drives, it is true that habits of

(394) susceptibility to craze stimulations may be developed. Thus, as Professor Ross rightly contends, one craze predisposes the public for another.

Convention. One is influenced toward conformity not only by the fashions and fads of his contemporaries but by their manners and conduct. The individual forms the impression that certain modes of action are universal, a belief expressed by the phrase 'they are doing,' or 'it is being done.' Since, however, acts are more important than styles, conventional usage is more stable than fashion. The tendency is to render permanent certain socially efficacious forms of behavior such as rules of etiquette. Acts of thought and attitudes upon fundamental questions also come under control of the habit of conformity. Widespread rationalizations sometimes acquire the force of conventions. Conventions may outlast their generation and pass over into customs handed down through social tradition. The two controls are similar in that the attitude of social conformity compels obedience to each. The attitude of conformity may be expressed toward either ancestors or contemporaries.

Custom. The successive influence of one generation upon another in matters of conduct is known as custom. The force of custom lies chiefly in the fact that its edicts are habits formed in the individual from earliest childhood. Custom acquires the additional force of convention. It goes deeper than the latter, however; for whereas convention is based upon the simple attitudes of universality and conformity, custom has not only these factors to enforce it, but early habit fixation and strong social disapproval in case of departure from the customary mode.

The explanation for the tendency to enforce customary behavior in society is to be found in habit. Breaches of custom seem objectionable to us chiefly because they do violence to long standing habits. Our dislike of such conduct is frequently expressed by the phrase, 'That's not the way I was brought up!' Professor Humphrey has given the most satisfactory account of this process. Our own acts of approach and avoidance have become conditioned, just as our feelings are conditioned in sympathy, by the sight of the same behavior in others. If my fellow performs a certain

(395) action, his behavior suggests (tends to evoke) the same response in me.[5] But this influence, if against the rule of custom, would go contrary (antagonistic) to my previously formed habit of response to that situation; hence an unpleasant thwarted feeling, and a struggle to prohibit this disturbing suggestion.[6] This attitude of disapproval may be expressed in the words 'he breaks my habit.' Pressure is accordingly brought to bear upon the non-conformist to eliminate his disturbing stimulation to others. Overt social disapproval thus allies itself with the attitude of social conformity to enforce adherence to custom.

Rumor. Hearing a remark from two or three distinct sources, or hearing it with the added suggestion that 'they are saying' it, generally produces in the listener an impression that the statement is being universally accepted and widely discussed. Submission to great numbers (attitude of conformity) causes the remark to have the force of a suggestion. Though heard only as a rumor it is believed and passed on to others as a fact. It is not, however, communicated with accuracy. Faulty assimilation as in conversation (p. 289), thought habits of the transmitter, personal repressions given escape through magnifying unconventional details, and effort to create a sensation, —  these are some of the factors which account for the distortion of rumor during its spread .[7]

Public Opinion. The term public opinion usually signifies some conviction, belief, or sentiment common to all or to the great majority. The distribution of opinion on a question, excluding the bias of parties or factions, probably follows the general form of the probability curve. The opposite views on any issue are represented by fewer and fewer individuals as we approach the extreme forms of these views. The moderate position expresses the opinion of the majority. This high peak of the curve is the consideration

(396) which guides political leaders in their quest of public favor. It is also exploited by the press. Revolutionary mobs, crowd-like subservience to party principles, and like phenomena destroy this sober balance between opposing extremes.

Public opinion is merely the collection of individual opinions. It has no existence except in individual minds; and these minds can only conjecture what the general consensus is. Like the other unorganized forms of social control public opinion acquires its power through the attitude of the individual. This attitude is one of ascribing universality to certain convictions and then supporting them strongly in order to conform with the supposed universal view. Newspapers and journals are self-constituted exponents of that which they assert to be the voice of the public. Their assertions are often hasty generalizations and sometimes deliberate propaganda. By pretending to express public opinion they in reality create and control it (p. 309). The illusion of universality may of course be used to establish a popular acceptance of enlightened views. The press thus has great possibilities, and indeed responsibilities, for promoting solidarity in constructive citizenship.

One of the most serious evils of American democracy is the exaggerated susceptibility to crowd-like control of private opinion. Impression of universality and the conformity attitude are so powerful that liberty of thought is scarcely tolerated. This fettering of free expression continues as an after-effect of the censorship necessary in the World War. Crowds and crowd-like publics dominate the thinking of the individual and tend to stifle independence of judgment.

Mob Rule. The processes of control operative upon the members of assembled mobs have been treated in Chapter XII. Mobs also attempt to control through violence all those whom they are pitted against. Small mobs, under the leadership of probable neurotics, commit coercive acts usurping the power of government. Racial and class hatreds, inferiority conflicts, and other mechanisms of maladjusted individuals motivate these efforts for social control. The crowd attitudes persist after the disbanding of the actual mob, leaving an emotional and intolerant public.

In a lynching mob, as exemplified by a lynching for sex assault,

(397) the following elements may be noted: (1) There is an immediate, sympathetically aroused, furious attack, as though the injury had been done to one's own family instead of to a neighbor's. (2) There is an attitude to protect one's family and the community from similar assaults in the future by controlling potential criminals through fear of death. This is the essence of rule by mob law. (3) Attitudes of male chivalry demand punishment of the offender. These attitudes take belligerent form partly because they are based upon rationalized sex jealousy and the double moral standard (p. 348). A genuine sexual assault committed by a woman upon a man would be regarded probably with humor rather than moral indignation. Committed upon a woman, the same act, through our man-made social standard, arouses horror and justifies vengeance through the life-blood of the offender. If the racial factor is present, a fourth element may be added in the desire to assert both the supremacy and the 'superiority' of the white race. This attitude makes a sex assault committed by a negro seem more heinous than the same deed done by a white man.

Lynching as a form of social control is an unmitigated blemish upon civilization. Yet it must be noted that the first two motives described above are in themselves far from evil. They contain the basis of sympathy, social unity, and government. The great harm of lynching lies not so much in the punishment given the offender as in the fact that he is denied the right of a fair trial. This alone is sufficient to condemn the practice. It should be remembered, however, that definite and powerful drives of human nature motivate such punishments, drives which are not evil but wholly natural. Overweening sentimentalists, therefore, who denounce lynchers as lawless barbarians who ought to be hung for murder, contribute nothing to the solution of the problem. So long as there are races or individuals too poorly socialized to be controlled by any power less than fear of immediate death, this form of punishment will probably continue to exist. What is needed is not righteous indignation, but a deeper psychological understanding of the whole matter.

Before leaving the subject of mob rule it should be noted that the mechanisms of control through crowds may be used for

(398) socially constructive ends. If we omit the intolerance arising from mental conflicts released in mass movements, we shall find that the other factors, such as social facilitation, impression of universality, conformity, suggestibility, and social projection, are valuable means for enlisting cooperation. Campaigns for building schools and hospitals, patriotic enlistment and self-sacrifice in war, constructive pride in community, and reformation through evangelistic revivals are a few results of the more favorable influences of the crowd. If combined with insight and civic education, and if used for the true interest of humanity, such influences make for permanent as well as present achievement.

Control through Institutions. a. Government. The most stabilizing of social controls are exerted, not by the changeable sweep of public opinion or mob rule, but by the organized and regulated institutions of society. Foremost among these are government and law, education, and religion. Law is largely custom which is enforced not merely by threatened disapproval, but by the more drastic punishments of governmental control. The body of people upon whom such controls are operative make up the state. While following roughly the lines of race and nationality, the state is not coterminous with these groupings. The control exercised by government has usually been one of fear. Withdrawal from wrongdoing or inhibition of anti-social acts has become established by punishment administered upon the commission of these acts. The government, standing permanently ready to inflict pain or deprivation upon the wrong-doer, forms a control which has the full strength of the avoiding responses. Institutional control, like all other forms, is thus established by conditioning of mechanisms within the individual.

Contemporary sociologists are unanimous in their plea for the socialization of government, and for rendering its control positive and constructive rather than purely prohibitive. Government should be considered not as a control separate from and above the people, but as a working expression of each individual's will. The larger interest must be made personal (Follett). Genuine democracy means not merely a list of rules to keep one person from overriding another, nor yet the balancing against each other of the

(399) representatives of opposing factions. It means rather the cooper-ation of all individuals and parties toward the common good. Officials should be elected with a view to their ability to govern all, not as champions of a particular group of interests (Fern).

Such ideals would require a widespread campaign for social participation among the mass of voters and citizens. There must be a fuller socialization of all the drives, not merely of the avoiding reactions. The pleasurable, or approaching responses must be conditioned by situations giving opportunity for social service. A drive for obedience to law and regard for others is as necessary as a fear of disobedience. Desirable as this goal may be we must admit it to be very difficult of attainment. An extensive program of public education would seem to be the first step. The school presents a valuable opportunity for socialization which will be discussed presently.

Revolution, or sudden change in government, has been ascribed to the failure of this institution to adapt itself to the progressive changes of economic and social life. Immobility leads to sudden and complete disruption of political control.[8] A clearer notion may be gained by considering revolution as an overt conflict resulting, like all conflict, from an attempted thwarting of the needs and actions of individuals. The old government maintains an active struggle to suppress all measures aiding the champions of the new order, measures which would reduce the advantage and prestige of those already in power. The radicals struggle to change the form of control in such a way that their desires can be more readily satisfied. Such change is sought partly as a, compensation for inferiority 'projected' as a charge of injustice against the régime in power (cf. the radical personality, p. 372). On the part of ` many adherents it is also an objectively justified struggle against actual political oppression.

The occurrence of a revolution depends upon several factors. The most important of these are: (1) the degree of thwarting pressure exercised by the party in control, (2) the arousal of inferiority conflict in the subjugated class, and (3) the waning of the strength of the upper power. Martin assumes the continual presence of

(400) crowds all struggling for supremacy. He lays great stress upon the third point mentioned, showing how, as soon as the controlling faction weakens or disintegrates, the 'radical' crowd, closely united through struggle, drives it out and usurps the government. Being essentially a crowd, this party proceeds to govern with all the intolerance, hatred, and lack of insight of the crowd man. At length it too goes to pieces through failure of its `abstract principles' to give free play to the desires of all its members.[9] This view of revolution and its consequences applies no doubt to some political upheavals, for example the French Revolution; but it is by no means a universal sequence. Revolution, it is true, does not in itself establish a proper government; but it does 'clear the air' and allow an opportunity for unhampered political thought. Mob control is a danger that arises pending the selection of leaders who can administer the government wisely and constructively.

Revolution is a beneficial social change if it represents the struggle of the large majority against the tyranny of the few. It is detrimental if brought about by a few of the radically minded who impose their will upon the majority. The same estimate applies to changes not in the government itself, but in the character of the legislation which it enacts. A good example is the recent prohibition amendment in this country. It is clear that a wholesome and needed drift of opinion toward restriction of alcoholic liquors had been developing during the years preceding this legislation. This represented the wish of the substantial majority. The passage of this sudden and drastic measure, however, and the violence of its attempted enforcement in many quarters, suggest the defense mechanism of the neurotic in whom alcohol is bound up withmental conflict. Agitators of this type exploited the temperance sentiment already present in launching their extreme campaign. The impression of universality and attitude of conformity operated in swelling the ranks of prohibition supporters. It was indeed difficult for a voter or a legislator to cast a ballot against what he felt to be the opinion of the vast majority of morally minded citizens. As a result of this crowd-like legislation widespread discontent is felt. The law is openly violated in many places. Judi-

(401) -ciaries have posted placards warning the people to support the government against the collapse of legal authority. A disruptive movement is imminent which may do ultimate injury to the cause of temperance as well as to judicious reform in other directions.

We have already discussed the function of government in protecting society by the control of anti-social members. Control of enemies without is its second fundamental purpose. Such protection has been traditionally maintained by powerful armaments through which respect for the rights of the individuals of the nation has been enforced upon other countries. This form of control represents the conditioning of the withdrawal responses upon a nation-wide scale. Intimidation, however, sometimes fails to avert aggression, and war ensues. Warfare is a struggle resulting from the thwarting of the prepotent drives of the individuals of one nation by the governmental power of another. We have previously seen that there is no instinct to fight merely for the sake of fighting (p. 58, footnote), but that the sole cause of struggle is the thwarting of the drives of one individual by the behavior of another. The only way to eliminate war is therefore to eliminate aggression. Reduction of armaments will never by itself accomplish this purpose. If we draw the lion's teeth and then steal his food, he will fight with his claws. The only power which can abolish warfare is a concerted control, or super-government having the power to coerce each national government to abstain from violating the rights of other nations. The final definition of these rights must rest with an international tribunal backed by the strength of the concerted government to enforce its decisions. An opportunity to aid in establishing such a super-national control was recently forfeited by the government of the United States through the rationalized, self-seeking conservatism characteristic of crowd-publics.

A few words should be added concerning social behavior in the work of law-making bodies. Assemblies have the value of permitting the representatives of various interests to meet and exchange opinions. On the other hand such bodies, like all co-acting audience-groups, are capable of being readily converted into crowds. Facilitation of emotional response, impression of universality, and the conformity attitude, especially with regard to party opinion,

(402) operate in no small degree. These factors no doubt contribute to the intolerance and narrowness of some of our local and national assemblies, as shown in prohibitive statutes, restriction of free speech, and provincial foreign policy. Such crowd influences are doubly unfortunate because the principle of delegated government demands independence of thought on the part of each representative. Influences of this type could be reduced by entrusting greater power to small, well-chosen committees. Even if this policy should arouse a cry of `autocracy,' the situation would be no worse than the sectional crowd control and log-rolling existing at present. Another means of diminishing crowd factors in assemblies is the reduction of 'oratory' and other forms of persuasive appeal to a minimum. Finally, we should not overlook the social subvaluent characteristic of thought processes carried on in the presence of the group (p. 273). While discussion is indispensable for obtaining the broadest point of view (p. 289), it is equally necessary to have a period of solitary reflection before deciding upon abstruse questions. The solution indicated would therefore be to have the vote taken from Congressmen in their private offices, after a period of solitary thought has followed open debate. Such a procedure would also dispel the somewhat irrational attitude of conformity which we found in judgments given in the presence of others who were judging the same issue (p. 277).

b. Education. The school is preeminently the institution for socializing the individual. Modern education strives to find the original interests of the child, and to build upon these a superstructure of knowledge and skill. Simultaneously with this, education must bring about a conditioning of these approaching and withdrawing tendencies by the laws and customs of society, and must modify their efferent expression along lines which are socially constructive. The range of fundamental drives available for such educational control is broader than that upon which legal control is based; for education builds upon the approaching as well as the withdrawing reactions. In this work the school merely continues the earlier and vitally necessary training in the home. The school therefore should be an institution, not merely for endowing the individual with abstract knowledge, but for so modifying his

(403) responses of avoidance, hunger, and love that they shall serve as means to cooperative social living.

The aim of socialization deserves fuller recognition than it has yet received in the administration of education. Training to become a citizen is no less imperative than the acquisition of knowledge and vocational habits. Students should be given systematic instruction in the afferent aspect of social behavior. Teaching the significance of tones, gestures, facial expressions, and mannerisms is of considerable social importance, since their appreciation is fundamental for the development of sympathy and tact. The child should be taught to respond to physiognomy, bearing, and other indications of personality in his associates and in adults. The desirable in human character can thus be quickly recognized, and discriminating responses established. Older children and adolescents are greatly influenced through some chosen ideal, it may be a parent or any older person, or even an historical character. Toward the behavior of this ideal their fondness and submission renders them highly suggestible.[10] Personal controls of this type offer opportunities for the establishment of traits and attitudes of the highest social value.

The classroom itself affords a valuable setting for the inculcation of moral attitudes. The submission and conformity of the individual in the co-acting group is here brought into play. Truths imparted receive added weight through the perception of their effect upon the other students; and this effect is further reinforced by circularity (p. 301). The primary groups within the school also afford the milieu necessary for the development of the social self (pp. 286, 333).

The school curriculum can profitably be made more social in content. This may be accomplished, first, through emphasizing humanistic studies, such as history, literature, and the social sciences, and secondly, through laying stress upon the social application of facts learned. In the higher vocations the latter method is exemplified by the teaching of social hygiene in the medical curriculum or the application of jurisprudence to social

(404) welfare. The occurrence of the good man in the socially deplorable business would be rendered less common through the influence of such education (Smith). Finally, the political obligations of each prospective voter should be provided for by a definite course of training.

Inasmuch as children are taught in social groups, the laws of social behavior have an important bearing upon the teaching method. Teachers are becoming more and more impressed by the possibilities of the face-to-face relations. Recitation now involves more discussion and interchange of ideas than formerly. Classes are sometimes subdivided into small discussion groups. In some colleges the inauguration of a tutorial system serves the same purpose. The modern teacher is more than a mere monitor for keeping the student fixed upon the right course; she serves as an interlocutor by whose aid the student acquires a deeper understanding of the lesson (Mead). The chief benefits to be derived from this method are increased incentive for thought, heightened interest, development of self-expressive personality traits, discovery of new facts and viewpoints through discussion, and training in social values and desirable forms of behavior.

The co-working situation of the class room with its response to contributory stimulations from other pupils is no less significant than the face-to-face relation (cf. Chapter XI). There is usually a facilitation of movement in the direction of the instruction given. Students work more energetically when working in groups. For some pupils, however, the classroom environment may prove distracting. Rivalry may be employed, but with careful attention to its variable effects on students of different ages, ability, and temperament, and in relation to quality of performance and type of occupation. Since social facilitation has a distinctly lower value in the more complex intellectual occupations, this type of work may well be done without the presence of co-workers. On account of the subvaluent for thinking done in the co-acting group, it is important to assign some problems for the student to think out when alone. Through suggesting details of this sort social psychology can render a distinct service to educational method.

c. Religion. Religious control, like governmental, is, in its

(405) primitive form, a control of the inhibitory or withdrawing responses of individuals. In some branches of the Christian faith there still remain traces of control by fear, either fear of physical torment in Hell or of loss of divine salvation. Separation from 'Grace' or excommunication, brings with it an intolerable loneliness and banishment from social as well as divine approval. The experience of being `lost' is perhaps a renewal of the childhood feeling upon being estranged from the loving parent. Conviction of sin and lurid warnings of future damnation, methods which flourished in the days of Wesley, still form a part of emotional religions and revivals.

But the Christian religion offers positive appeals of an equally powerful nature. In the very versatility of its controls there seems to lie the secret of the ascendance of Christianity over all other faiths in western civilization. The appeal of love is perhaps the dominant note. All who seek comfort from the world may find it in the fatherhood and brotherhood of the deity. Thwarted love interests and sex conflicts (such as those described in Chapter XIV) may obtain a kind of introverted resolution through a 'spiritualization' of the love, and fixation upon a Being of divine and therefore sexless nature. Celibacy of the clergy both in early and modern times, and austere religious teachings regarding sex life, are two of the many indications of this process. Ritual, hymnology, prayer, and scriptures are rich in symbols of the personal love theme carried out on a plane of exalted imagination.

Religion also offers a solace for oppression, for worldly limitation, and for other species of inferiority. The Christian faith is preeminently the religion of the humble. 'Many mansions' are in store for the poor disciple. The Beatitudes are the apotheosis of worldly humility and distress, the glory of the future life being the imaginal compensation. In the altar service of the revival the prostrate penitent is fervently exhorted to rely upon the vicarious atonement of the Savior. The crucified Christ is pointed out as the one upon whom the sins of the world have been laid. Vividly imagined, this picture offers a ready opportunity for placing upon another the sense of guilt and worthlessness carried by the penitent. Christ is not only punished for our sin, but, he assumes our guilt,

(406) thereby letting us go morally as well as physically free. It is necessary only to 'believe on Him' (that is, to believe in this divine assumption of man's iniquity). The moral inferiority is thus projected upon another, and relief is obtained from the conflict (cf. p. 368).

The majority of persons controlled by these specifically religious appeals are probably of the introverted type (pp. 116, 362). They are the tender minded, seeking in the imaginatively constructed reality of the Divine Order a release of thwarted tendencies. The church appeal is, however, broader than the purely religious appeal. The congregation is a brotherhood; and the bonds of sympathy and social participation are strong in the fellowship of religious worship. Opportunities are offered also for the development of the social self, and for the pleasures of sociability in face-to-face groups. It is thus that the church attracts and controls many of the more extroverted type.

In congregating for religious worship there lurks the possibility, often realized, of the formation of a crowd. The emotionality of the penitent seeking salvation as well as the ecstasies of those who have found it are, in revival services, facilitating stimulations of great power. Suggestions take effect in the formation of attitudes (conviction of sin) and in their release (coming forward for salvation). The influence of the more suggestible in being the first to start the movement is of great importance. Periods of prayer and religious services are often observed in order to 'prepare' for the advent of a great evangelist into a town or city. These activities have the psychological effect of establishing attitudes of profound and expectant submission toward the coming apostle (first aspect of suggestion). With such preparation the excesses characteristic of crowd phenomena are an easily predicted sequel.[11]

It is an open question whether the appeals of divine love and imaginal compensation will not always be vital elements in religious control. They are perhaps a necessary and desirable sphere of release for the introverted personality. On the other hand the progress of the church as an institution of social control is to be

(407) sought rather from its social than from its religious development. Other-worldliness and the redemption dogma are being quietly ignored by the more progressive members of the modern clergy. Such as these have the welfare of humanity rather than the glory of God at heart. The abolishment of creed and of the symbolism of personal love and salvation would of course weaken the religious significance of the control. Yet the loss in imaginal comfort to the 'tender-minded' could be compensated by a gain in socialization. And perhaps the control of individuals through an ethical code and an altruistic love for fellow man would be of higher ultimate value to the human race than the centering of that love upon a transcendent personality.


Social Behavior in Commercial Attitudes. Credit and Panic. The pursuits of manufacture and exchange offer a field for the study of special social attitudes. The good name or prestige of a business firm, though usually thought of as an attribute of the firm itself, is really an attitude common to a large number of patrons and citizens. It represents their readiness to deal with that company; and is built up by careful advertising and honest dealing, and strengthened in the public by the impression of universality, until it becomes a salable asset known as 'good-will.' This control over commercial attitudes we shall speak of as economic prestige.

Credit is a similar social attitude. It consists in the neuromuscular setting of business men to trust the individual or firm concerned. This attitude of others toward one's self is automatically established by discharging one's debts, and is rapidly disseminated through rumored reputation and inquiry. Since credit is merely an attitude in others, and not a fixed personality trait in the individual, it is subject to sudden alteration. It is conditioned not only by the character of the debtor, but by the general state of the market, in itself largely a psychological phenomenon. The heightening of credit attitudes leads to the financial 'boom'; their lowering precipitates the crisis and panic. The sequence is usually as follows. An era of prosperity brings a rapid development of business enterprise. Large ventures are undertaken for the financ-

(408) -ing of which credit is freely extended. Wages and prices rise; and for every actual dollar in hand there are involved in transactions many dollars on paper secured only by the attitude of credit. The number and magnitude of these transactions exaggerates the impression of universal prosperity (ability to meet credit obligations) and with it the credit attitude beyond the point justified by actual conditions. Speculation is encouraged. Thereupon a few reckless ventures fail; and with the news of these failures each creditor having large loans at stake becomes uneasy. The rumor now becomes one of impending depression; and the universality attitude works in the direction of reducing the willingness to give credit. Credit is withdrawn, businesses liquidate, wages and prices fall, and failures increase. The crisis rumor may be partially an expression of a wish on the part of those to whom a drop in prices would be an economic relief. Thus the phenomena of credit inflation and depression, while starting in actual economic conditions, achieve their impetus mainly through rumor and the impression of universality.

Social Control and Exploitation in Business. The aim of the business man is to increase his business; that is, to induce people to buy his product or service. The very nature therefore of business implies a ceaseless and varied endeavor toward social control. The salesman and promoter employ the art of oral suggestion, enforcing it by assuming an ascendant, face-to-face attitude and by thrusting their 'prospects' into the submissive role. Personality traits thus attain great importance in the selection of selling personnel and in the social contacts involved in selling.

Advertising is a form of control which has assumed gigantic and wasteful proportions in modern business. A more socialized ethics than that which the business class has evolved is necessary to curb this growing evil. Every form of appeal is employed in order to coerce individuals to buy. Protection from injury or impending disaster, sex, humor, hunger, pleasures of the palate, love of wife and children, the social self attitude, caste, social conformity; patriotism, and even love and respect for one's mother are all played upon to induce the purchase attitude and fill the coffers of the profiteer.[12] These appeals are conditioning stimuli for the

(409) arousal of prepotent responses in a manner conducive, not to the socialization or efficiency of the consumer, but to the gain of a limited class of commercial men. Human nature is thoroughly exploited.

Advertisers do not limit themselves to control through the fundamental activities. They capitalize many other laws of social behavior. The buyer is controlled by verbal and pictorial suggestion. His submissive and conforming attitude is evoked through creating an impression that a large number (which to the unthinking individual means 'every one') is buying the product. Suggestion is further increased through quotations from individuals in authority, or through social and financial prestige. Attitudes of compensation for inferiority in physique, education, wealth, and social status are freely exploited.[13]

Such advertising involves not only unjustifiable exploitation of the human drives, but artificial stimulation of demand, wasteful establishment of consumptive ideals, and competition in extravagant styles and luxuries. Discontent and envy among the poorer classes are a further result of these enticing but expensive appeals. It is true, of course, that not all advertising merits the above criticisms. Some firms do not advertise to stimulate demand or to arouse approaching responses by irrelevant appeals; but are content merely to state the essential merits and price of their products. General culture and comfort are promoted by this class of advertising. Aesthetic improvements have also been made (although the landscape is still disfigured by bill-boards). This finer sense of social values is, however, not yet shared by the majority of business houses.

Economic institutions exert further social control through the agencies of journalism and art. Newspaper propaganda, paid for by business interests, often controls public opinion (cf. p. 308). Standards are set for literature, drama, moving pictures, and music

(410) by the producers and publishers who know 'what the public wants' (and consequently what it will be willing to pay for). In these fields appeals to the controlling responses, not for cultural but for commercial ends, restricts the sphere of individual enjoyment and profit. As long as the tired seeker of recreation can be diverted by the vulgar humor of vaudeville, the covert sexuality of the farce, or the open sex appeal of the burlesque, and as long as he can identify himself with the luxury of the social life he envies on the cinematograph screen, he will have little incentive for learning to enjoy true aesthetic appeals conveyed through the same media. Spurious standards of art are thus established, and then reinforced through the impression that every one is attending and talking about these productions. The commercialized control of the economic and cultural activities of the individual retards education, checks independence of thought, heightens crowd influence, destroys art, sets false goals to endeavor, and cheapens and exploits the best things in life. It is especially deplorable that while business employs all the drives (both approaching and withdrawing) for social control, government, the institution most deserving of this prerogative for social ends, has scarcely advanced beyond the use of conditioned fear responses.

From these considerations there emerges the mission of the economic genius with the welfare of society at heart. Capitalists and financiers are men of power in every community. Success in business brings success in the leadership of civic and social reforms and of public enterprises. The common people subscribe to a cause if it is endorsed by the financial leaders; economic prestige brings personal prestige. There rests upon men of business an opportunity and a responsibility for socializing the power which they exert in society at large.

Industrial Phases: Behavior in Co-working Groups. The work of industry, like that of government, education, and religion, is conducted in group. Industrial group, composed _for example of factory and office employees, are definitely limited to the co-acting type. The laws of behavior in response to the stimulations from co-workers find in these groups a ready application. We may expect social facilitation with its resulting social increment. Effects

(411) upon quantity and quality of output will be found to vary with the type of work, the size of the group, the closeness of the operatives to one another, differences of ability and temperament among the workers, and other conditions as described in Chapter XI. The incentive of rivalry may be effectively used to a certain point, more especially if quality is not important. Rivalry combines with the economic incentive under bonus and piece-work systems of payment. The use of these contributory social stimulations to increase productivity is a form of social control no less potent than the control of the consumer through advertising. Where exercised without regard for the welfare of the employee such controls merit even sterner criticism than those of the commercial sphere.

Working groups are converted into crowds by happenings which release emotional and withdrawing and struggling reactions. Bad working-conditions, underpay, fatigue, monotony, and continual fear of unemployment are sufficient preparation for the arousal of panic among industrial workers. When a few of the weaker succumb the sight of the evil feared acts as a suggestion, facilitating the spread of weakness, terror, and general collapse of morale. Concerted struggle responses, as in strike violence, illustrate another phase of industrial crowd facilitation. Crowds of this sort were discussed in an earlier chapter (pp. 294, 310).

Industrial Conflict. The recent wave of industrial conflict in this country provides instructive material for the student of social behavior. The full reason for this epidemic of strikes and labor agitation is by no means clear. The condition of laborers and trade-workers has been on the whole better in recent years than ever before. The war brought an era of high wages and better living conditions which seem to have remained fairly stable ever since. Psychological causes, other than those resulting from the oppression of the worker, must be sought to explain the prevailing unrest. The rise of unions and the principle of collective bargaining have given laborers a power which they have never before felt. This actual power of unions is increased psychologically through the impression of universality (consciousness in each worker of the strength of his organization). With the impression of large numbers there comes also the belief in the supreme justice of demands made

(412) by these great bodies. Control through these crowd mechanisms has been widely exercised by agitators both in assembled crowds and through radical literature.

Another cause seems equally significant in modern industrial conflict. Labor unions are not only weapons for concerted economic struggle; they are defenses organized against the imputation of inferiority. Under the influence of the Russian revolution, a movement growing out of age-old class distinction and oppression of the proletariat, American laborers sought to relieve their minds of the unpleasant consciousness of inferiority. This they did by projecting upon the capitalistic class the charge of oppression and the intent to keep them (the workers) in a state of social and economic slavery. It is true, of course, that their charge of unfair distribution of wealth is partly justified. But the sweeping and exaggerated claims made by radical leaders show that the economic drive is not the basic motive. Thwarting of the domestic and economic life is a rationalized cause for class hatred. It is more satisfactory to the I.W.W. member to ascribe his humble status to the injustice of capital than to his personal incompetence. He must hate capitalists accordingly, and must organize a concerted movement against them. Various other straws point in the same direction. Coupled with the outcry against inequalities in the award of profits is the assertion that one man is entitled to as great a share as another. Labor as a whole is indispensable. It has great power as well as dignity. Each laborer should therefore participate equally with the capitalist and manager. By arguments of this sort individual differences of education, native ability, and enterprise are glossed over. Another indication of inferiority conflict is the attempt to equalize the status of labor with that of professional and executive work. The trades mechanic asserts that the doctor or lawyer 'gets paid for his brains' rather than for his time; so why should not he demand the wine? He implies that, since brains are the basis of the claim to salary, there should be equal remuneration in the two cases. The fact that brains may differ in value is not allowed to enter the discussion. Regulations also of unions regarding apprenticeship aim toward the elevation of the trade in question.

(413) The rule that a helper must always accompany the expert mechanic, while no doubt serving objectively useful purposes, also increases the self-esteem of the expert. Like the professional man he too must have his assistant. There has recently, arisen a somewhat affected independence in the skilled and domestic trades regarding wages, hours, and readiness to serve. This attitude is a part of the general protest against possible imputation of inferior social status. It is reinforced and directed toward social control through the crowd factors in trade unionism.

What is the remedy for this unfortunate situation? The cure for all conflict lies in insight. The manual worker must realize that labor does not have to be protected against the slurs of those who do not have to work, but that it has by its own merit sufficient proof against such slurs. Nature has not made men equal in ability. Some merit greater remuneration than others because they make possible such rewards by rendering a rarer and more vital service to society, a service which can be given only by high capacity together with professional training. Further than this fact no inferiority exists in the status of the working man; and certainly no disgrace attaches to that status. Industrial workers must be brought to face these facts squarely. They must realize that no one is charging them with inferiority except themselves; and further, that much of their outcry against 'economic oppression' is a futile attempt to ward off this self-originated accusation and to escape the facts. If the worker is thus fated to remain at a modest economic and vocational level, vicarious compensations should be sought in avocational interests, wise employment of leisure and pleasures of home life. It is true that such compensations would require more favorable hours off work and better wages than some employers are willing to give. This, therefore, is the obligation which rests upon the capitalist and industrial manager. Employers must assume their share of the problem by enabling the worker to find outlets in useful and pleasurable channels for the drives which are thwarted by his limited vocational status.

Owners, directors, and managers cannot escape their duty in the resolution of the conflict of inferiority in the worker's mind. Huge profits, displays of wealth, emphasis upon differences of education

(414) and culture as though these were the natural heritage of the rich, all tend toward increasing both the worker's feeling of inferiority and the hatred through which his envy is rationalized. To abolish provocation for this caste feeling would be one of the greatest services which the capitalist and employer could render to the cause of industrial harmony.

But a more basic adjustment, a real change of attitude in industry, is necessary before lasting harmony can be secured. There must be a partial abandonment of the diminishing returns principle upon which business is largely based. Instead of calculating the wages and benefits to be given the employees upon the basis of the profitableness of such measures to the firm, the basis must be the welfare of the human beings concerned. Interests of profit must be tempered by regard for the needs of the workers. This does not mean a socialistic control of industry; but merely a socialization of individual control.

To state the matter in another way, big business should be administered with two purposes instead of one. These two purposes are profit making and social adjustment. Neither of them should be sacrificed wholly to the other, but both should be kept in view. There is no argument to justify unlimited acquisition of wealth or unrestricted return for capital or ability. Laissez faire, right to buy in the lowest market and sell in the highest, privilege of employing, paying and discharging as one pleases, are not natural and sacred rights of mankind. They are merely useful assumptions which may become rationalizations for greed. The capitalist stresses the justice of his scheme just as the socialist preaches the justice of the confiscation of capital. In the same manner both sides in the late war prayed to the same God, and each demanded from him the right of victory. There is no abstract or absolute Right which can be evoked to justify either side. The immediate personal needs of human beings sweep aside these rationalized fictions. Power for social control brings with it the obligation to exercise that power wisely and well. Corporations, therefore, which control the livelihood and destinies of thousands must face the responsibility of so ordering that control as to satisfy the needs of human life and bring contentment to their workers.


We may summarize under four principles the basic requirements for a truly democratic social order. These are: (1) a fair chance for all; (2) reward according to value of the service rendered (a principle involving inevitable inequalities of reward); (3) the abolishment of inferiority attitude and envy among the members of the humbler vocations; and (4) the recognition by business and industry that their power for social control renders obligatory the adjustment of that control to the prepotent drives and psychological needs of their employees.


The Concept of Social Heredity. In discussing social unity and control we have been concerned chiefly with problems of contemporary social organization. The unity of society through time, or historical continuity from the past to the present, is another field of inquiry in social science. Here belong the stabilizing habits of past generations transmitted as customs, folkways, and laws. The continuity and development of the institutions of control also form a part of this study. These traditional safeguards of the individual's needs have given society a stable and lasting character. Another heritage binding the present to the past is the body of transmitted culture embraced in science, arts, inventions, politics, literature, and philosophy. The acquisition of this knowledge from the elders affords to each generation valuable tools for the discovery of further knowledge. Hence, among peoples fortunate enough to produce geniuses originally or to acquire the beginnings of culture through contact with other peoples, cultural development has proceeded at a fairly geometrical rate.

These two sets of transmitted influences, the laws or mores and the intellectual and material culture, have been figuratively but aptly included under the term 'social inheritance,' or 'social heredity.' The importance of this concept is shown by considering the total inadequacy of the biological inheritance (the innate reactions of the new-born infant described in Chapter III) for adjusting the individual to his present environment. Human behavior would rest in an inconceivably primitive stage if these innate reflex mechanisms were not conditioned and modified in youth through

(416) the accumulated experience of past generations. By responding to present social stimuli conveying this experience the youth steps with seven league boots over the entire cultural history of mankind, and arrives at maturity a socialized twentieth-century man.

The Social Character of the Individual's Thinking. The stability of human society is best appreciated when we realize that thought itself has its origin in social contacts. Concepts, or symbol reactions (p. 197), the essential tools of thinking, have evolved ' through language and have therefore a social origin. A word had its original use as a means of representing an object to another, and controlling another's behavior with reference to that object (cf. pp. 187-88). To the hearer it was originally a stimulus to assume an attitude for reacting to the object denoted in compliance with the intent of the speaker and in conformity with the attitudes of others toward the same stimulus. The word thus evokes a response to the represented object in its social setting (Mead). This fact gives to meaning itself a fundamental social significance.

Concepts are therefore social in character: they denote or represent objects common to all members of the group. The attitudes of response to these concepts (meaning) are moreover identical among all the group members. Times, places, customs, heroes, natural processes, occasions for sentiment, and many other matters form common objects around which center the similar responses of all the members of the group.[14] Conformity of response furthermore standardizes the usage of concepts and renders them resistant to rapid change. This stabilization accounts for the difficulty of establishing reforms of spelling or of systems of measure (Peterson). In the broader aspects also of thought we find an inseparable social significance. In order to comprehend a question in all of its bearings we must study the history of social discussion which has centered about it up to the present time (Ayers).


The social nature of thinking has engaged the attention of philosophers, who have pointed out its profound significance for the theory of knowledge. The validity of human knowledge for ascertaining ultimate truth is conditioned by the social character of the instruments of knowledge. Reality is seen from the standpoint of human society. As Professor Ames has expressed it, "Consciousness is related to the order of nature in and through the social order."[15] This identity between the social attribute and reality in thinking is illustrated by the confusion existing in primitive minds between the name of a thing (social characterization) and the thing itself. A peasant is said to have remarked that the hardest thing for him to understand about astronomy was how they were able to find out what the names of the stars were!

In the infant as in the human race the development of thought is, through language, inseparably connected with stimulation from the social group. So long as the baby cannot use words he has but slight possibility of noting the essential, common elements of various situations; for words are symbols by means of which such abstraction is carried on. Language calls attention to these common elements by assigning names to them.[16] A word 'fixes' a workable concept for use in future analysis and generalization. It furnishes a handle by which to grasp the essentials of any new situation. The acquisition of concepts within the group thus gives the child a foothold for climbing the heights of knowledge which are his social inheritance.

We may summarize the role of language as a vehicle for social continuity in the following statements: (1) Language makes possible the accumulation and recording of stabilizing and cultural tradition from generation to generation. (2) It gives a social aspect to meaning and to human knowledge through the community of behavior which it evokes toward the denoted objects. (3) It serves as a stimulus for controlling and modifying the individual's

(418) behavior through learning in accordance with the social inheritance. And (4) it equips the individual with the tools of thinking.

Social Behavior in Discovery and Invention.. The continuity of society in time does not require the transmission of ancestral habits in rigid, unalterable form. With changing environment, with increase of knowledge, and with the labor of geniuses there occurs a gradual change in the social order. The chief instrumentalities for this change are scientific discoveries and inventions. Through these a broader vision of man and nature is obtained, and needs are fulfilled upon a more efficient level.

The interweaving of the social influence into human reasoning, while it gives solidarity and permanence to the group, produces also a fixity of thought habits and resistance to change. Attitudes of conformity further reinforce this conservative tendency. The inventor and the discoverer, however, are more plastic in their thought responses than other men. They cast aside traditional impediments and conventional ways of thinking. They stand alone in the detachment from social influence from which they approach their problems.[17] Stimuli evoke from them responses often quite at variance with the customary mode of human reaction. This fact is well illustrated by the invention of the cotton gin. Cotton producers had for a long time despaired of being able to produce a machine that would 'extract the seeds from the cotton.' It remained for a northern inventor, unfamiliar with cotton manufacture, and therefore unhampered by fixed habits of thought, to think of a contrivance to take the cotton out of the seeds.

While we are stressing the individuality of thought in the genius, it must not be forgotten that a social background of culture is absolutely necessary as a basis and starting point for his work. Few inventions are unique discoveries; most of them are perfections of previous discoveries. The steam engine has a history which extends from the second century B.C. to the present time. Watt was merely an outstanding figure among the many contributors to its development. The course of invention is similar to that of

(419) discussion (p. 289). The product of one inventor's work is a stimulus which evokes a response in another. Unlike the case of discussion, however, the behavior which produces the stimulus may be widely separated in time and space from the response evoked. This response, as in discussion, is neither a mere duplication of the earlier work nor a wholly new production; it is a new turn given to the inventor's thought by the product of an earlier inventor's genius. A modification is discovered which better adapts the original invention to the need which set both thinkers working. Without the stimulation of the earlier invention this particular turn of thought might never have been produced.

There have been pointed out by Professor Creighton three aspects from which social influences may be seen to have determined scientific thinking. First, individual problems of any magnitude are also social problems. Universal human need sets the thinker to work. Secondly, stimulation of one individual by the behavior or the work of another (as described above) is of fundamental value. Various alternatives arise from the suggestions of various individuals, or from different points of view representing the opinions of others, assumed by the thinker at different times. Thirdly, the discovery must be phrased in language, and thus made susceptible of verification by others. Social confirmation is necessary to establish its validity.

Leadership. Social change, as we have just seen, results from the products of the inventive, scientific, and artistic genius of special individuals. It results also from another type of personal agency, namely leadership. Leadership produces social change, not through contributions to knowledge or material culture, but through the immediate social behavior of the leader. Leadership, according to our present usage, means the direct, face-to-face contact between leader and followers: it is personal social control. The promoter and organizer are leaders par excellence, for they compel others to carry out their suggestions. Persons of great social wisdom or inventive power often lack the ability to control others for the execution of their plans. For this reason we must distinguish between intellectual eminence and leadership. We shall use the term 'leadership' to mean the phenomenon of control

(420) of the followers by the leader, rather than the personal trait, or traits, of the individual who leads. The latter will be discussed in a separate section.

The most important factor in the rise of a leader is personal prestige. This, like economic prestige, is a phenomenon existing not in the person himself, but in the attitudes of others toward him. An illustration will make the matter clear. Suppose we go to a theater and witness the work Of a talented young actor. Our emotions are stirred, and we carry away the impression that this man thoroughly understands his art; but it has not occurred to us that he is in any sense great. The next day our glance falls upon a placard in a shop window announcing the appearance of so-and-so (the actor we have seen) who is "now considered America's Foremost Tragedian." Our former judgment is speedily reinforced by an impression of universality. We imagine the entire public to be talking about the 'new star' and accepting him with acclaim. He is no longer merely a good actor in our opinion, but a great actor. Attitudes of this type contribute to the fame and power of the leader. The impression of universality through the press or rumor strengthens the belief in the superlative gifts which he is supposed to possess; and all who hear or read become submissive toward whatever he may do or say. We may speak of this phenomenon as personality-prestige to distinguish it from the 'economic prestige' of business firms. The whole propaganda may of course be false, as is frequently the case in political leadership. Prestige lies rather in the social attitudes of those surrounding the person than in his own character.

Symbolic devices add to the prestige attitude of followers toward their leader. The honorary title, the degree, the 'shoulder straps' of the army officer, and the crown and scepter of kings are examples of such symbolism. These objects represent power; they also establish a transfer (conditioning) of the attitude usually evoked toward the power symbolized to the person who displays the symbols. The private is taught that in saluting the officer he is saluting the majesty of the American People. The prestige of the officer as an individual is greatly increased by exacting this form of salutation. Control through leadership is based largely upon the suggestion

(421) process. Some leaders are merely 'crowd exponents,' who seize upon motives and attitudes already prepared in all, and use their personality-prestige to reinforce suggestions releasing these attitudes. Others are leaders in a more fundamental sense. They build up attitudes in the public which they lead, and educate their followers to adopt a course for the ultimate social good rather than for the immediate release of prepotent drives. The process requires patience, endurance, and greatness of mind, traits which are of higher worth than adventitious prestige of personality. Such 'group builders' make use of all three phases of the suggestion process (cf. Chapter X).

In leadership, as in all suggestion processes, it is necessary that all the inhibitions blocking the acceptance of the suggestion be overcome. Leadership thus knows no half-way stage: it is a matter of 'all or none.' While the public is with the leader it follows slavishly his every direction. His character is regarded as without flaw. He is the ideal. Such blind leader-worship has yielded grotesque results. This was the case, for example, in the election to the mayoralty of a great city of a favorite of the hour who had previously borne a prison record. When a few adherents begin to question the action of the leader his decline is precipitous. His suggestions fail to quell the antagonistic attitudes: therefore his power is lost.

Since leaders usually secure their power through suggestion and crowd control, rather than through reason, one may question whether leadership is wholly desirable. It would doubtless be better if we could moderate its all-or-none character and introduce discriminating action among the followers. This change would, however, greatly restrict the power of the leader. It would also require a considerable campaign of education. People are more readily persuaded to follow as one of a crowd under a leader than to labor separately and constructively for some social end. As Professor Steiner has indicated, the rule by persuasive leaders who capitalize the mechanisms of crowd-influence stands in sharp contrast to the enlightened coordination of individual effort in community welfare.[18] While the latter method may be the more

(422) desirable, it is more remote from present realization. For the present we should perhaps be willing to use the inferior means; that is, crowd leadership, for the sake of the ends to be gained.

Differences of ascendance, intelligence, social participation, and drive for control will probably always tend to produce leadership. Some fulfill their destinies in leading, others in following. Still another fact may be cited in favor of personal leadership. Whereas government is still based upon the negative or avoiding-response type of control, civic leadership employs the positive, approaching drives of human behavior as a means of achieving its ends.

The Personality of the Leader. Turning now to the qualities which characterize the leader, we find the trait of ascendance to be of paramount importance. Unless the leader assumes an ascendant, dominating role, leadership in the sense here defined is impossible. Men must be made to adopt a submissive attitude before they can be controlled by personal suggestion. The leader must be endowed in their minds with that personality-prestige described in the preceding section. Ascendance of manner is usually combined with physical power. Tallness of stature, though not always necessary, is of great service to leaders. It is true, however, that many leaders have been small or frail men. Lack of physical size is sometimes a direct basis for the development of compensatory traits of great energy and endurance. Other traits valuable to leaders are high motility (rapid and energetic reactions), tonus shown in gesture and ring of the voice (cf. p. 219), erect, aggressive carriage, tenacity, face-to-face mode of address, and the reinforcement of energy flowing from a fairly high emotional level. Feeling and outward action are, however, under perfect control; they are governed by a certain restraint which gives the impression of an unlimited reserve of power behind them. The true leader never gives the appearance of playing his last card. The characteristics described in this paragraph were probably in the mind of Emerson when he wrote that the highest greatness does not need works to reveal it, but is " self-evident."


Allied with the appearance of reserve power is the impression that there are intellectual resources or plans of action in the leader's mind which are not comprehended by the ordinary man. This air of inscrutability increases submission of attitude through the awe of the unknown and the veneration of genius. There must, however, be set up many points of contact between the leader and his followers. The apparent contradiction may be explained by saying that while the leader is expansive regarding the field of action which he dominates, he is reclusive concerning his personal life and underlying plans and motives. High intelligence is necessary for the constructive type of leadership. Even the demagogue must present the appearance of having greater knowledge of the situation than that possessed by the common man.

The true leader also stands high in the group of traits described under sociality (Chapter V). He is keenly susceptible to social stimulation, and controls his constituents largely through his understanding of their natures. His ascendance is moderated by tact and true zeal for the social welfare. Social participation is one of his strongest interests, although in mingling with and controlling the throng he holds his own private life somewhat aloof. Character in the ablest leaders is usually of a high order. The leader's consciousness of social self is both strong and elevated.

One of the central traits of the constructive leader is his drive. He is truly appreciated only in action; he leads in some cause. The project for which he stands is likely to be the key-note of his entire personality. Upon this he focalizes all his energy and ability. For this reason many leaders appear to be narrow in their intensity. This is especially true of revolutionary leaders such as Cromwell and Samuel Adams, and upon a lower plane, Robespierre, Alexander Dowie, and Carrie Nation. In such persons compensation for inferiority, moral inadequacy, or other defense attitudes, may be the causal factor behind their leadership in a particular issue (pp. 373-74). High intelligence, ascendance, and motility sometimes accompany these factors of conflict and projection. Most crusade leadership is of this radical type. It may, of course, be productive of good if the drive of the leader allies itself with some objectively needed social change. For most eonstructive enterprises, however,

(424) and for social crises there is required a leader having a more sanely balanced and objective motivation.

Popular Movements. A faction headed by a leader is usually a heterogeneous crowd or public. Many participants are probably actuated by the same constructive drive or projected conflict as the leader himself. Others join for different reasons, partly because, as Martin points out, the crowd-principles are framed in sufficiently general terms to be accepted as the goal of many and diverse motives. Unlike in origin, the drives of the multitude converge upon a single course of action proposed by the leader. A large number of the followers of radical leadership are not individuals of radical personality. Their interest may have been won by the true merits of the proposed change. Nearly all popular movements are syntheses of diverse drives, conflicts, and sentiments in the public which participates. The leader evokes concerted action and gives definite aim to these individual forces. Social movements thus bear the stamp of both the genius and the personal bias of their leaders.


Social Progress as the Well-Being of the Individual. Our outlined survey of social behavior in its relation to social phenomena is now completed. In conclusion there remain to be considered a few questions of a broad, ethical nature. What improvements, we may ask, may be hoped for within the social order; and how may they be brought about? Many theories of social progress have been advanced. Most of them are conceived from the sociological point of view, that is, as improvements in the structure, organization, and controls of society as such. There has been postulated a super-organic evolution, working, not through morphological changes, but through human intelligence and culture, and advancing toward the goal of the perfect society. Several difficulties are encountered in this notion of the progress of society as a whole. First, the a priori principle of super-organic evolution and natural selection in groups as wholes is hypothetical, and at best very limited in modern life. Society is not necessarily progressing in a fixed direction or toward a definite goal, but is changing, now this way, now that, according to the laws of human be-

(425) -havior interacting with environmental and personal agencies. A second objection to this notion of social progress is what we lack a standard for determining what the ideal society should be. Would not the perfect type of social order differ for every people and every age? Since we have no experience upon which to pattern our ideal of society as a whole, this ideal must necessarily remain a mere postulate.

We can, however, judge the social order from the standpoint of its internal excellence, that is, from the perfection of the adjustments secured by the individuals who compose it. The good society is thus to be conceived as that which is good for its members. Its merit lies solely in their happiness. In the first chapter of this book we observed that the true psychological and organic entity is the individual, not the social group. We may now add that the unit of progress is not society as a whole, but again the individual. Social progress is merely an inexact term for the enhancement of individual welfare.

What, then, is meant by individual welfare? In its broadest aspect this question has challenged philosophic thought since Socrates; and we cannot hope to solve it fully here. Some attempt, however, may be made to define this `highest good' from a practical and scientific viewpoint. Our thesis can perhaps be best presented through antithesis. The highest aim of life is not the achievement of an ideal of perfection. It is not the conquest of the 'Absolute' over the finite and conditional, nor of 'Reason' over the so-called baser desires. It is not even the state of perfect satisfaction of every want. Attainments of this sort would bring human behavior to a static and inert condition, quite at variance with the fundamental laws of life. The drive behind accomplishment has always been the need to fulfill some prepotent demand not satisfied within the present environment. Maladjustment and struggle will probably continue to be the fountainhead of progress as long as the human race exists. Perfection of adjustment would therefore destroy the very stuff of which progress is made. There is no escape from this venerable paradox. We are forced to recognize that the highest happiness lies not in the goal achieved, but in the perpetual sequence of struggle and achievement.


Life is essentially a process of disturbing and restoring equilibrium, of need and fulfillment. As derived drives, or interests, multiply and diversify, the struggle for adjustment becomes a problem of ever-increasing complexity, and success in the struggle brings a richness and variety of satisfactions not experienced in the more primitive stages. The Summum Bonum lies not in an ultimate attainment, but in these very cycles of effort and success, new effort and further success, repeating themselves endlessly at ever newer and more intricate levels throughout life. Human progress is thus a process, eternally moving. Its current runs in the stream of life itself. The notion that it implies an ultimate and static goal is a philosophic fiction.

The aim of life, moreover, is not one but many. There are, first, the processes of adjustment of the drives which are fundamental in human behavior. Upon these are based a multitude of habits, or derived drives, all demanding satisfaction through use. Transcending the bare essentials of physical existence, these drive's pervade and enrich the great spheres of aesthetic, religious, intellectual, and social development. All of these interests finally crave fulfillment. Abilities of all sorts, native and acquired, also present a claim for their realization in the tasks of life. Growth and learning produce an increasing complexity in the pattern, a complexity which demands an intricate and enlightened mode of adjustment. The best living, as in the old Greek view, consists in the fullest exercise of this behavior equipment in the struggles and satisfactions of life.

Our conception of progress is therefore to be individual rather than collective, dynamic in aim rather than static, a struggle rewarded by tentative adjustment rather than perfect and final adjustment. It is a process, biological and mechanistic. It is the exercise of a plurality of living functions, rather than the pursuit of a single fixed and transcendental goal.

Summary: Social Behavior in Relation to Progress. Progress is therefore in the fullest sense an increased success in living. It means that one is to be faced with problems of ever-increasing complexity, but problems which one has the power to solve, and which in the solving yield a wider and richer range of approaching

(427) responses and enjoyments. Conflicts which diminish our power to solve these problems must be removed by effective resolution. A final common path must be discovered which releases in modified form both the socialized habit and the primitive drive which opposes it. Justice is required for all phases of human nature if our functional ideal of progress is to be realized.

A nice balance of socialization and adjustment is therefore required within the individual. Release must be accorded to all the prepotent reactions. At the same time, this release must be so modified by early social environment and by control through social institutions that it does not obstruct the release of the same responses in others. Wholesome expression of the vital activities in each individual must work hand in hand with the socialization of his behavior for the sake of others. The progress of the individual, however, must not be thwarted by an over-socialized or socialistic control of each by all. Though drives be socially modified they must still operate in a field of fair competition in which differences of ability and industry receive their reward.

Among the derived drives or habits acquired early in life and operating almost with the force of innate reactions, the drives for social contact and approval stand out conspicuously. The presence of others has conditioned not only our withdrawing reaction (moral behavior), but also our pleasurable, approaching responses. We have learned to love society for itself. Fostering this type of development contributes richly to the life of the individual; for he lives in a sense in the pleasures and adjustments of others as well as in his own. Primary sociability groups and a socialized plan of education are means which are useful toward this end. Personal control, conversation, suggestion, sympathy, and humor are among the processes which may be used to inculcate traits of sociability. The social drives should be directed early toward the fixation of desirable traits of character. For the socially inclined, incentives may be readily discovered for establishing approved habits as well as deterrents from conduct which meets with social disapproval.

The danger of over-development of the social drives through childhood training must also be recognized. Love which is fixated too strongly upon the parent may thwart the normal expression of

(428) the sex drive in maturity. Exaggerated submission to elders or to religious teaching has an equally unfavorable effect upon the struggle responses. Over-socialization within the family produces weak, subdued, and emotionally unstable personalities. Rapport of the child with the parent should offer a means for the training of capacities and the assimilation of desirable character traits. Yet this must be done without forming attachments so strong as to lead to serious conflict in mature life.

The individual's attitude toward reality and toward the social sphere may be made an asset in his progressive adjustments. Were every human being to acquire insight, and to see himself as he truly is, projected inadequacies, leading to destructive social conflicts, would be abolished. Constructive compensatory effort would become the rule. A false or deluded ideal of self should not hide from the individual his true nature. The desire to establish attitudes of social approval toward one's self is a spur to the highest self-development. But this is only true provided the drive is to merit as well as to attain the esteem of others. Honesty with one's self concerning one's traits, abilities, and position should be inculcated by special training in home and school. The possession of insight is a prerequisite for harmonious social adjustment.

The response to social stimulation in the group and crowd is also significant for the theory of individual well-being. Social facilitation may be used to increase cooperative achievement instead of being left to the devices of the orator. The impression of universality and attitude of conformity have a higher mission than the spread of propaganda and crowd hatreds; they may be employed to reinforce ethical conduct and social standards chosen wisely and for the good of all. It is imperative that the press and other agents of publicity cease to foster the belief that people are universally interested in wasteful fashions, sentimentalities, hysterical hatreds, fears, scandals, and murders. There is need, instead, of establishing the belief that socialized and progressive attitudes are becoming universal and therefore imperative for the individual.

Socialized freedom for life adjustments may be promoted by emancipating the individual's moral standards from crowd influence. Broad and successful living forbids us to rationalize our

(429) private cheatings and hostilities into acts of social justice through the support of a crowd whose members all desire the same excuse. The truly moral man does not require such self-deception. For him the right is identical with the welfare of all, not with the desire of his particular faction. Public opinion and standards of thought and conduct are in need of similar emancipation. We must live our lives to the satisfaction of our own ideals, with profound respect for the rights of others, but without regard for their prejudices and crowd-like intolerance. Only with clear insight and unfettered by crowd-control can we fully realize our possibilities for successful living.

Correction of abuses in the social institutions and in the sex relationship is a further means of releasing the capacities for a well-rounded life. Economic controls should be made to relinquish their exploitation of prepotent drives and conflicts for private gain. Business interests must cease to prey upon human suggestibility and debauch both popular ideals and art. Workers must be freed from the stigma and the self-accusation of inferior social caste. There is needed also the recognition of the moral independence of the growing girl and the release of woman from her dwarfing subjugation to a male code of rationalized chivalry. The institution of government can be made an affair of popular social participation, rather than an agency for inculcating fear and repressing vital tendencies. For religion there are greater possibilities of social service than the pampering of weakness and the control of the individual through attitudes of moral inferiority and thwarted sexual desire. The church can be made an instrument for the amelioration of social adjustments rather than a means of escape from them. And finally, through the socialization of the school, educational aims, methods, and curricula can be turned to the service of progressive living.

In all of these ways social behavior and the social inheritance can be brought into the service of more adequate adjustment. The individual, through such reforms, will be assisted in carrying on the advancing cycle of problem and solution, of need and fulfillment. He will be enabled, moreover, to carry it on in cooperation with his fellows, and through the needs and satisfactions of the social life

(430) itself. But this is not all. Social continuity teaches us that the social behavior and adjustments of one generation are, if successful, handed on to posterity as useful rules of living. We thus live on in the habit systems of succeeding generations in proportion to the value of our contribution to the social order. The stimulations which our behavior gives to others are perpetuated in a vital tradition for the guidance of the ages to come. Life is enriched not only through the scope of one's own adjustments, but through the influence of those adjustments re-embodied in the lives of others. Progress which is the achievement of the individual becomes the heritage of the ages.


Social Unity, Groups, Community, Social Classes:

Ellwood, C. A., An Introduction to Social Psychology, chs. 2, 4, 5.

Cooley, C. H., Social Organization, parts I, IV.

Munsterberg, H., Psychology, General and Applied, chs. 16, 17, 19.

Bogardus, E. S., Essentials of Social Psychology (2d ed.), chs. 11-13.

Boodin, J. E., "The Unit of Civilization," International Journal of Ethics, 1920, xxx, 142-59.

Wright, H. W., "The Basis of Human Association," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1920, XVII, 421-30.

Steiner, J. F. (A series of articles on community organization), Journal of Social Forces, 1922-23, I, 11-18; 102-08; 221-26.

Douglass, H. P., The Little Town. Groves, E. R., Rural Problems of Today.

The Psychology of Race and Nationality: 

Le Bon, G., The Psychology of Peoples.

Fouillée, A., Equisse psychologique des peuples européens. Paris. Alcan, 1914.

Brigham, C. C., A Study of American Intelligence.

Shepherd, W. R., "The Psychology of the Latin American," Journal of Race Development, 1919, ix, 268-82.

Tolfree, A. G., "The Russian Character," Atlantic Monthly, 1918, CXXI, 596-600.

Ellis, G. W., "The Psychology of American Race Prejudice," Journal of Race Development, v, 297-315.

Thomas, W. I., "The Psychology of Race-Prejudice," American Journal of Sociology, 1904, IX, 593-611.

—— "Race Psychology: Standpoint and Questionnaire with Particular Reference to the Immigrant and the Negro," American Journal of Sociology, 1912, XVII, 725-75.


Pillsbury, W. B., The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism. McDougall, W., The Group Mind.

Partridge, G. E., The Psychology of Nations.

Hocking, W. E., Morale and its Enemies, chs. 3, 6, 10, 12.

Brown, H. C., "Social Psychology and the Problem of a Higher Nationality," International Journal of Ethics, 1917-18, XXVIII, 19-30.

Gault, R. H., Social Psychology, ehs. 4, 5, 10, 11.

Psychological Theories of the Nature of Society:

Ellwood, C. A., Introduction to Social Psychology, ch. 14.

Tarde, G., The Laws of Imitation (translated).

Le Dantec, F., L'égoisme, base de toute société. Paris. E. Flammarion, 1912.

Hirst, E. W., Self and Neighbor.

Northcott, C. H., "The Sociological Theories of Franklin H. Giddings," American Journal of Sociology, 1918, XXIV, 1-23.

Giddings, F. H., "Pluralistic Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, 1920, xxv, 385-404; 539-61.

Davis, M. W., Psychological Interpretations of Society.

Unorganized Social Controls (General)

Gault, R. H., Social Psychology, ch. 8.

Dewey, J., Human Nature and Conduct, part 1.

Ross, E. A., Social Psychology, chs. 4-16.

Patrick, G. T. W., "The Psychology of Crazes," Popular Science Monthly, XVIII, 285-94.

Bogardus, E. S., Essentials of Social Psychology (2d ed.), ehs. 7, 8.

Ginsberg, M., The Psychology of Society, chs. 7, 8, 10.

Anonymous, "War-time Prosecutions and Mob Violence Involving the Rights of Free Speech, Free Press, and Peaceful Assemblage." National Civil Liberties Bureau, New York.

Public Opinion:

Cooley, C. H., Social Organization, part u.

Shepard, W. J., "Public Opinion," American Journal of Sociology, 1909-10, XV, 32-60.

Ross, E. A., Social Psychology, ch. 22.

Sageret, J., "L'Opinion," Revue Philosophique, 1918, LXXXVI, 19-38.

Yarros, V. S., "The Press and Public Opinion," American Journal of Sociology, 1899-1900, v, 372-82.

Cobb, F. I., "Public Opinion." Senate Document, no. 175 (66th Congress, 2d session). Govt. Printing Office, Washington.

Social Organization and Control (General):

Wallas, G., The Great Society.

Cooley, C. H., Social Organization, part v.

Ross, E. A., Social Control.

Baldwin, J. M., The Individual and Society.

Williams, J. M., Principles of Social Psychology.

Edman, L, Human Traits and their Social Significance, part 11.


Social Control through Government:

Rivers, W. H. R., Psychology and Politics.

Wallas, G., Human Nature in Politics.

Martin, E. D., The Behavior of Crowds, 7-10.

Cooley, C. H., Social Organization, part III.

Follett, M. P., The New State.

—    "Community is a Process," Philosophical Review, 1919, XXVIII, 576-88. 

Ginsberg, M., The Psychology of Society, eh. 11.

Kern, R. R., "The Supervision of the Social Order," American Journal of Sociology, 1918-19, XXIV, 260-88: 423-53.

Le Bon, G., The Psychology of Revolution.

Haynes, G. E., "Race Riots in Relation to Democracy," Survey, August 9, 1919, 697-99.

Social Control through Education:

Snedden, D., Educational Sociology.

Smith, W. R., An Introduction to Educational Sociology.

—    "The Sociological Aspects of our Educational Aims," American Journal of Sociology, 1918, XXIV, 81-95.

Dewey, John, The School and Society.

—   "The Role of Social Heredity in Education," American Journal of Sociology, 1919, XXIV, 566-80.

Lull, H. G., "Socializing School Procedure," American Journal of Sociology, 1919, XXIV 681-91.

Mead, G. H., "The Psychology of Social Consciousness Implied in Instruction," Science, N.S., 1910, XXXI, 688-93.

Keatinge, M. W., Suggestion in Education.


Social Control through Religion:

Ellwood, C. A., The Reconstruction of Religion.

McComas, H. C., The Psychology of Religious Sects.

Davenport, F. M., Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals.

Mecklin, J. 1\l., "The Passing of the Saint," American Journal of Sociology, 1919, XXIV, 353-72.

Social Continuity and Change:

Ellwood, C. A., Introduction to Social, Psychology, chs. 7, 8.

Edman, L, Human Traits and their Social Significance, ch. 11.

Sumner, W. G., Folkways.

Kidd, B., The Science of Power.

Ogburn, W. F., Social Change. 

The Social Character of Thinking:

Mead, G. H., " A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," Journal of Philosophy, 1922, XIX, 157-63.

——"Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," Psychological Bulletin, 1910, VII, 397-405.

——"What Social Objects must Psychology Presuppose?" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1910, VII, 174-80.


——"The Mechanism of Social Consciousness," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1912, IX, 401-06.

Creighton, J. E., "The Social Nature of Thinking," Philosophical Review, 1918, XXVII, 274-95.

Peterson, J., "The Functioning of Ideas in Social Groups," Psychological Review, 1918, xxv, 214-26.

Pintner, R., "Community of Ideas," Psychological Review, 1918, xxv, 40210.

Ayers, C. E., "The Epistemological Significance of Social Psychology," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1918, xv, 35-44.

The Psychology of Leadership and Invention:

Leopold, L., Prestige: A Psychological Study of Social Estimates.

Terman, L. M., "The Psychology and Pedagogy of Leadership," Pedagogical Seminary, 1904, xi, 413-51.

Gault, R. H., Social Psychology, ch. 9.

Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order. ch. 9.

Baldwin, J. M., Social and Ethical Interpretations, chs. 3-5.

Bogardus, E. S., Essentials of Social Psychology (2d ed.), chs. 9, 19.

Harlow, R. V., "A Psychological Study of Samuel Adams," Psychoanalytic Review, 1922, IX, 418-28.

Taussig, F. W., Inventors and Money-Makers.

Royce, J., "The Psychology of Invention," Psychological Review, 1898, v, 113-14.

Haines, T. H., "The Cross-Breeding of Ideas as a Factor in Invention," Mental Hygiene, 1922, VI, 83-92.

The Theory of Social Progress:

Ellwood, C. A., Introduction to Social Psychology, ch. 13.

Todd, A. J., Theories of Social Progress.

Munsterberg, H., Psychology and Social Sanity.

Patrick, G. T. W., The Psychology of Social Reconstruction.

Dewey, J., Human Nature and Conduct, part IV.

Bernard, L. L., "The Conditions of Social Progress," American Journal of Sociology, 1922, XXVIII, 21-48.

Kempf, E. J., The Autonomic Functions and the Personality, part IV.


  1. Various investigators rate the intelligence of the full-blooded negro as roughly between two thirds and three fourths of that of the white race. In the scores of the army mental tests the standing of the drafted negroes was very low. Experimental data regarding the intelligence of the Mongolian and American Indian races are meager. From present indications it seems that both these racial stocks are below the white in intelligence. The early and remarkable development of Oriental civilization is, however, a fact which indicates the need of caution in classing the Chinese and Japanese among the races which are inferior to the white in mental capacity.
  2. Researches of Dr. W. M. Marston (unpublished).
  3. Compare Professor Pillsbury's conception of the 'national mind': ". . . There is one sense in which the nation does assume many of the aspects of a person. This is as an ideal center of reference for emotions. The nation, as a concept, is a reality. About it the emotions of the members cluster. Increasing it ... gives them emotions of joy, impairing its existence . . . gives sorrow or anger very much as does the waxing or waning of the individual's own ideal self." (The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism, p. 222 f.) This writer later rejects the idea of the nation as an objective entity separate from individuals.
  4. Cf. p. 367, and footnote.
  5. This is due, not to instinctive imitation, but to the fact that I have observed others making the same movements formerly at a time when I was also making them; hence the establishment of this movement as a conditioned response to the sight of some one performing it.
  6. "The Conditioned Reflex and the Elementary Social Reaction," Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1922, XVII, 113-19.
  7. Detailed illustrations of the rumor process may be found in the following works: Swift, E. J., Psychology and the Day's Work, ch. 8; Smith and Guthrie, General Psychology, p. 226; Jung, C. G. Analytical Psychology, ch. 4.
  8. Ellwood, C. A.: Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 170-71.
  9. The Behavior of Crowds, chs. 7-9.
  10. This susceptibility to adult suggestion we have previously referred to in discussing both suggestibility (p. 249) and identification (p. 367, footnote).
  11. For a detailed account of the crowd factors in religion the student should consult F. M. Davenport: Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals.
  12. Direct. appeals to sex desire am often used to attract attention to advertisements of wearing apparel and other items much less relevant. "You furnish the girl; we'll furnish the home" is a sign flaunted by a certain furniture store. "The kind of candy father used to buy to make mother happy," is the essence of an inscription circulated by a well-known confectionery firm in order to capture Mother's Day sentiment.
  13. Advertisements of prescriptions guaranteed to take the kink out of colored people's hair are among the most flagrant examples the writer has seen.
  14. Cf. Smith and Guthrie: General Psychology in Terms of Behavior, ch. 7. Such 'institutionalized objects' and the common reactions toward them Professor Kantor regards as the main field of study for social psychology. This view, though suggestive, is, in the writer's opinion, too narrow. It presents the communal aspects of human action; but it unduly neglects the great field of behavior in which another person (rather than a common object) is the essential stimulus. (See J. R. Kantor: "An Essay Toward an Institutional Conception of Social Psychology," American Journal of Sociology, 1921- 22, XXVII, 611-27: 758-79; also, "How is a Science of Social Psychology Possible"' Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1922, XVII, 62-78.)
  15. "Social Consciousness and its Object," Psychological Bulletin, 1911, , 407-16.
  16. For example, the writer's child having seen a box turned over, and having been told that it was 'upside-down,' was later found lying on his back in his crib with feet in the air, remarking that he was "side-down in bed." The previous use of the term had called his attention to an abstracted situation, namely, a position which any object might assume. The social environment, through language, had thus given him a new concept to think with.
  17. In the act itself of thinking we have also seen that solitude is necessary for the highest attainment. Thinking carried out in a social group partakes of conversational expansiveness and shows a subvalent in quality (pp. 273— 74).
  18. “Community Organization and the Crowd Spirit," Journal of Social Forces. 1923, I, 221-26. The reader will find in this article a number of instructive examples of crowd control and its exploitation for the sake of community enterprise.

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